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亚洲城ca88新金融论坛
亚洲城ca88新金融论坛第35期
日期:2019-09-24   阅读:18次

主  题:Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation

时  间:2019年9月24日(周二)18:30-20:00

地  点:亚洲城ca88玉泉校区经济学院236会议室

主讲人:陈涛 新加坡南洋理工大学助理教授

主办方:亚洲城ca88,ca88官网会员登录,ca88手机版登录入口

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协办方:亚洲城ca88资产管理研究中心

  亚洲城ca88金融研究院

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主讲人简介:

Tao Chen joined Nanyang Business School (NBS) as an Assistant Professor in Finance in 2014. His research interest focuses on how financial markets participants (e.g., analysts and institutional investors) impact corporate policies, which broadly includes corporate finance and corporate governance, mergers and acquisitions, tax avoidance, and banking and financial institutions.

He has published his work in Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Banking and Finance, and Journal of Corporate Finance.


Abstract:

This paper studies how conflicts between equity holders and bond holders affect the design of corporate managerial compensation. Firms with a higher ownership by institutional investors that simultaneously hold equity and bond of the firm (“dual holders”) adopt compensation policies with lower risk-taking incentives. Using financial-firm mergers that create dual holders for their portfolio companies as shocks, we identify a causal link between dual ownership and managerial compensation structure. Furthermore, dual holders vote on compensation-related managerial proposals in a way that reduces risk-taking incentives, compared with pure equity holders of the same firm.


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